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EDITOR’S  NOTE:  The  following  article  is  adapted  from 
a  seminar  paper  presented  at  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  Richmond  on  June  20, 1975. 
I.  Introduction 
While  much  has  been  written  over  the  years  con- 
cerning  monetary  policy,  there  is  apparently  a  dis- 
continuity  in  the  flow  of  information  between  policy- 
makers,  on  the  one  hand,  and  academic  researchers 
and  participants  in  financial  markets,  on  the  other. 
Much  of  this  lack  of  communication  centers  specifi- 
cally  on  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  mone- 
tary  policy.  As  a  result,  much  of  the  research  into 
the  policy  process  is  based  on  incorrect  assumptions 
concerning  how  policy  is  managed.  Sherman  Maisel, 
a  former  member  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  of 
Governors,  argues  that  the  Fed  itself  is  a  source  of 
this  communications  gap:  “The  Fed  has  always  re- 
sisted  being  too  specific  about  [its]  methods  and  its 
goals,  clothing  its  operations  in  a kind  of  mystique 
that  left  it  more  freedom  to  maneuver”  [18,  p.  26]. 
In  the  opinion  of  many  policy  observers,  this 
communications  failure  has  real  costs,  both  in  terms 
of  public  understanding  and  the  effectiveness  of 
policy.  While  the  Fed  is  reluctant  to  specify  its 
procedures  too  explicitly  in  order  to  protect  its  free- 
dom  of  action,  “its  attempt  to  protect  itself  from 
both  outside  critics  and  internal  disappointment  .  .  . 
weakens  its  ability  to  improve  its  performance”  [18, 
p.  311]. 
Recently  a  number  of  papers  have  been  directed 
toward  unraveling  the  mystique  that  surrounds  mone- 
tary  policy.1  The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  synthe- 
size  and  extend  the  recent  literature  on  this  subject 
and  thereby  provide  an  interpretation  of the  monetary 
policy  process  and  a  model  of  current  open  market 
strategy.  Hopefully,  this  article  will  contribute  to  a 
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better  understanding  of  current  policy  procedures 
and  will  help  to  identify  problem  areas  toward  which 
further  research  should  be  directed.” 
This  article  consists  of  seven  sections.  Section  II 
presents  the  background  to  the  current  strategy.  The 
following  three  sections  describe  long-run  aspects  of 
current  policy  formulation,  the  linkages  between  the 
long-  and  short-run  policy  process,  and  short-term 
open  market  strategy,  respectively.  An  analysis  of 
the  effect  of  the  constraint  on  interest  rate  volatility 
on  short-run  policy  actions  is  presented  in  Section 
VI,  followed  by  some  final  remarks  in  Section  VII. 
II.  The  Evolution  of  the  Current  Strategy 
An  important  paper  by  Jack  Guttentag,  published 
in  1966,  described  the  Federal  Reserve’s  policy  pro- 
cedures  of  the  1950’s  and  early  1960’s  as  the  money 
market  strategy  [10].  Under  the  money  market 
strategy,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  proximate  focus  was 
on  the  “condition  of  the  money  market”-generally 
understood  to  include  the  value  of  a  constellation  of 
interest  rates,  free  reserves,  and  the  inventory  posi- 
tions  and  financing  costs  of  securities  dealers.  With 
such  national  economic  goals  as  full  employment  and 
price  stability  remote  in  time  and  causal  connection 
from  conditions  in  the  money  market,  the  use  of 
money  market  conditions  as  a  proximate  target 
tended  to  focus  policy  too  narrowly.  As  a  result, 
Guttentag  argued  : 
The  main  weakness  of  the  [money  market]  strat- 
egy  is  its  incompleteness,  i.e.,  the  fact  that  the 
Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC)  does 
not  set  specific  quantitative  target  values  for  which 
it  would  hold  itself  accountable  for  the  money 
supply,  long-term  interest  rates,  or  any  other  ‘stra- 
tegic  variable’  that  could  serve  as  a  connecting  link 
between  open  market  operations  and  system  objec- 
tives;  rather  it  tends  to  rationalize  the  behavior  of 
these  variables  after  the  fact  [10,  p.  1]. 
To  correct  the  deficiencies  in  the  money  market 
strategy,  Guttentag  suggested  that  the  Fed  adopt  a 
complete  strategy-consisting  of  quantifiable  targets 
specified  over  given  control  periods,  with  the  se- 
quence  of  targets  linked  empirically  to  the  ultimate 
price  and  output  goals  of  the  economy.  Targets  are 
2 This  discussion  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  all  monetary  research 
has  been  useless  or  that  no  one  understands  the  essence  of  current 
policy  procedures.  With  regard  to  the  latter.  it  is  clear  that  many 
financial  market  analysts  have  considerable  expertise  in  assessing 
the  implications  of  day-to-day  Federal  Reserve  actions. 
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affect  by  manipulating  policy  instruments.3  Included 
in  the  set  of  targets  are  both  intermediate  targets 
such  as  interest  rates,  bank  reserves,  and  monetary 
aggregates,  and  longer-term  final  targets  (or  goal 
variables)  such  as  output,  employment,  and  prices. 
Instruments  are  the  magnitudes  under  direct  policy 
control  and  include  open  market  operations,  the  dis- 
count  rate,  reserve  requirements,  and  interest  rate 
ceilings. 
A  control  period  is  the  time  interval  over  which 
the  attainment  of  targets  is  planned.  A  complete 
policy  strategy  involves  a  number  of  control  periods, 
each  giving  primary  emphasis  to different  target  vari- 
ables.  For  example,  over  a  weekly  control  period,  an 
operating  target  such  as  the  Federal  funds  rate  or 
nonborrowed  reserves  might  receive  emphasis  ;  over 
a  monthly  or  quarterly  control  period,  an  intermedi- 
ate  target  such  as  the  growth  rate  of  M1  might  re- 
ceive  emphasis.  In  control  periods  as  long  as  six 
months  or  a  year,  long-term  target  variables  such  as 
output  and  employment  would  be  the  major  policy 
goals. 
A  strategy  is  complete  if  its  intermediate  target 
is  a  strategic  variable,  linked  empirically  to  the 
economy’s  long-term  output,  price,  and  employment 
goals.  This  implies  that  the  policymaker  is  cognizant 
of  the  linkages  among  the  various  elements  of  the 
strategy.  In  a  more  formal  sense,  a  model  of  the 
monetary  policy  transmission  mechanism  such  as : 
instrument  intermediate  target  long-term  target 
must  be  developed.4 
Guttentag  was  careful  to  distinguish  between  policy 
strategy,  which  involves  the  selection  of  the  target 
variables  to  be  explicitly  considered  by  policymakers, 
and  policy  formulation,  which  involves  the  setting  of 
specific  values,  or  dial  settings,  for  the  target  vari- 
ables.  In  selecting  these  values,  the  policymaker 
examines  a  set  of  policy  determinants  such  as  rele- 
vant  financial  and  economic  data  and  forecasts. 
Clearly  the  development  of  an  overall  policy  strategy 
is  logically  prior  to  policy  formulation,  since  the  par- 
ticular  policy  determinants  that  the  policymaker  con- 
siders  are  dependent  upon  the  strategy  being  pursued 
and  the  transmission  mechanism  it  embraces  [7, 
pp.  6-11]. 
The  thrust  of  the  Guttentag  critique  was  rein- 
forced  by  a  number  of  events  that  increased  public 
3 Discussions  of  monetary  policy  have  long  been  plagued  by  semantic 
difficulties  with  such  words  as  targets,  indicators,  guides,  objectives. 
etc.,  with  the  same  words  having  different  meanings  to  different 
writers.  Such  problems  have  played  a  major  role  in  several  major 
controversies  in  monetary  economics  [20]. 
4 The  arrows  indicate  the  direction  of  causation.  See  [7]  for  a  clear 
discussion  of  the  transmission  mechanism  in  monetarist  and  non- 
monetarist  models. 
awareness  of  monetary  policy.  In  the  late  1960’s 
the  economic  stimulus  provided  by  the  Vietnam  war 
and  the  delay  of  the  1968  tax  surcharge  and  the 
intellectual  stimulus  of the  monetarist  counter-revolu- 
tion  served  to  focus  increasing  public  attention  on 
monetary  policy.  During  the  same  period,  the  de- 
velopment  of  large-scale  econometric  models  reflected 
the  substantial  impact  of monetary  policy  on economic 
activity  and  tended  to  emphasize  quantification  of 
policy  targets.  In  view  of  these  developments,  it  is 
perhaps  not  surprising  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
moved  toward  the  development  of  a  more  complete 
strategy.  In  1966  the  FOMC  added  a  “proviso 
clause”  to  its  Directive,  giving  explicit  weight  to 
movements  in  bank  credit  in  determining  policy  ac- 
tions.  In  1970  the  FOMC  first  began  to  include 
explicit  references  to  monetary  aggregates  in  its  in- 
structions  to  the  Trading  Desk.  An  important  step 
in  this  ongoing  process  was  probably  the  appointment 
of  Arthur  Burns  as  Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  in  early  1970.  In  this  regard  Maisel  states: 
“From  the  first  day  in  office  [Burns]  put  the  weight 
of  his  office  behind  greater  quantification”  [18, 
p.  70]. 
The  result  of  this  evolutionary  process  can  be 
stated  simply-monetary  aggregates  (e.g.,  M1,  M2, 
M3,  and  bank  credit)  now  receive  more  weight  in 
policy  deliberations  and  actions.  The  Directive-the 
FOMC’s  instructions  to  the  Manager  of  the  Trading 
Desk-now  includes  specific  values  for  various  stra- 
tegic  target  variables,  such  as  the  Federal  funds  rate, 
bank  reserves,  and  the  monetary  aggregates5  It  is 
useful  for  expository  purposes  to  divide  the  discus- 
sion  of  current  policy  procedures  and  strategy  into 
its  long-  and  short-term  aspects.  A  description  of 
these  components  and  their  interrelationship  begins 
in  the  next  section. 
Ill.  A  View  of  Long-Run  Strategy 
The  policy  process  begins  at  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  with  the  development  of  staff  forecasts  for 
GNP,  prices,  unemployment,  and  other  long-run 
targets  four  quarters  into  the  future.6  These  basic 
forecasts  are  undertaken  three  or  four  times  each 
5 The  more  specific  the  instructions  contained  in  the  Directive,  the 
less  discretion  or  latitude  the  Manager  has  in  executing  policy 
actions.  One  of  Guttentag’s  criticisms  of  the  Fed’s  operating  pro- 
cedures  in  the  1950’s  and  1960’s  was  the  ambiguity  in  the  Directive. 
He  stated:  “It  is  natural  and  a  type  of  poetic  justice  that  the 
words  used  by  the  Committee  in  giving  instructions  to  the  Manager 
are  thrown  back  to  the  Committee.  If  the  Committee  instructs  him 
to  follow  an  ‘even  keel  tipped  on  the  side  of  ease’,  for  example,  he 
can  report  back  that  he  ‘maintained  an  even  keel .  .  .’  and  the 
Committee  is  not  in  a  position  to  complain  that  it  does  not  under- 
stand  what  these  words  mean”  [10,  p.  18]. 
6 This  discussion  draws  heavily  from  the  work  of  former  members  of 
the  Board  staff:  Pierce  [23],  Pierce  and  Thomson  [25];  and  the 
work  of  former  Governors  Brimmer  [2,  3]  and  Maisel  [17,  18]. 
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are  referred  to  as  consensus  forecasts,  since  judg- 
mental  and  econometric  inputs  are  combined  into  a 
single  forecast. 
The  econometric  forecast  is  made  using  the  Board’s 
version  of  the  SSRC-MIT-PENN  (SMP)  econo- 
metric  model.7  Initially,  model  simulations  are  con- 
ducted  using  expected  values  of  exogenous  variables 
not  under  Federal  Reserve  control,  such  as  Federal 
Government  outlays,  and  a  trajectory  for  an  inter- 
mediate  target  variable  under  potential  Federal  Re- 
serve  control,  such  as  the  growth  rate  of  the  money 
stock.  The  same  money  stock  trajectory,  for  ex- 
ample  a  5  percent  annual  growth  rate,  is  also  as- 
sumed  by  the  judgmental  forecasters.  The  judg- 
mental  forecast,  prepared  by  staff  economists  in 
various  sections  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  is 
often  more  accurate  in  the  near  term  than  the  model 
forecast  [23,  p.  12].  Differences  in  the  econometric 
and  judgmental  forecasts  are  reconciled,  and  the 
consensus  forecast  is  prepared. 
One  should  not  infer  that  the  econometric  projec- 
tions  are  “pure”  in  the  sense  of  a  mechanical  appli- 
cation  of  an  existing  model  ; as  is  true  in  most  econo- 
metric  work,  a  considerable  degree  of  judgment  is 
involved.  This  notion  has  been  summarized  by 
Hymans  : 
No  [model]  operator-at  least,  one  with  much 
success  as  a  forecaster-lets  the  computer  center 
run  his  model.  Rather,  the  operator  considers  the 
model  to  be  nothing  better  than  the  best  statement 
of  the  internal  logic  of  the  economy  which  he 
happens  to  have  available.  While  he  rarely  tam- 
pers  with  the  model’s  interactive  logic,  he  recog- 
nizes  that  there  are  relevant  factors  which  he 
thinks  he  knows,  and  which  he  is  sure  the  model 
does  not  know,  about  current  realities  in  the 
economy.  In  some  way,  he  attempts  to  communi- 
cate  this  information  to  the  model.  .  .  .  And  what 
is  most  important,  much  of  the  relevant  informa- 
tion  which  has  to  be  communicated  to  the  model  is 
simply  not  contained  in  the  values  of  the  exogenous 
variables  [11,  p.  537]. 
For  the  sake  of  completeness,  it  should  also  be  noted 
that  the  judgmental  forecast  is  not  independent  of the 
econometric  projections.  The  various  forecasters 
interact  continually  and  therefore  a  judgment  about 
the  path  of  economic  activity  (especially  over  a  long 
time  horizon)  is  no  doubt  influenced  by  the  model 
simulations. 
Following  the  development  of  the  consensus  fore- 
cast,  the  Board  staff  usually  produces  a  number  of 
alternative  long-run  scenarios  of  economic  activity 
for  evaluation  by  the  FOMC.  First  the  consensus 
forecast  is  reproduced  quarter-by-quarter,  variable- 
7 See  [5],  [7],  and  [9]  for  discussions  of  the  policy  transmission 
mechanism  of  the  SMP  model. 
by-variable  with  the  econometric  model  by  adjusting 
the  constant  terms  in  selected  equations.  Alternative 
trajectories  of  monetary  growth  are  then  fed  into 
the  model  to  produce  a  consistent  set  of  monetary, 
GNP,  price,  and  unemployment  estimates.8  The 
FOMC  then  evaluates  these  alternative  scenarios  and 
selects  an  explicit  monetary  growth  path  for  the 
forthcoming  six-  or  twelve-month  period. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  implicit  dial  set- 
tings  for  the  final  targets  embedded  in  the  staff  fore- 
cast  may  not,  for  a variety  of  reasons,  be  accepted  by 
members  of  the  FOMC.  For  instance,  an  individual 
member  of  the  FOMC  may  not  believe  the  staff 
forecast  and  may  therefore  foresee  a  different  real 
sector  outcome.  Each  Reserve  Bank  President  has 
his  own  staff’s  view  of  the  economic  and  financial 
outlook  to  consider,  and  it  is  possible  that  his  staff 
has  a  forecast  quite  different  from  that  of  the  Board 
staff.  More  generally,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume 
that  each  member  of  the  FOMC  will  embrace  the 
estimates  developed  by  the  Board  staff  with  regard 
to  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  economic  ac- 
tivity.9 
Alternatively,  an  FOMC  member  may  have  a 
longer  planning  horizon  for  policy  than  the  four-  to 
six-quarter  projection  horizon  and,  therefore,  might 
not  believe  that  such  a  short-term  projection  should 
be  a major  determinant  of  current  policy  actions.  In 
the  current  setting,  for  example,  a  policymaker  may 
desire  to  drive  unemployment  down  to  4  percent  by 
mid-1976  but  might  feel  that  existing  economic  con- 
straints,  as  well  as  structural  relationships,  make  the 
risk  of  intensifying  inflationary  pressures  under  such 
a  policy  high.  Hence,  the  return  to  full  employment 
should  be,  in  this  member’s  view,  more  gradual  and 
occur  over  a  two-  to  three-year  period. 
Another  possibility  is  that  an  FOMC  member  may 
have  little  faith  in  any  of  the  assorted  projections 
and  instead  may  be  strongly  influenced  by  current 
economic  and  financial  conditions.  This  view  implies 
a  shorter  planning  horizon  than  four  to  six  quarters. 
Pierce  has  summarized  some  reasons  why  this  last 
possibility  may  prevail  from  time  to  time: 
It  is  very  difficult  to  convince  a  policymaker  to 
move  an  instrument  in  what  he  views  to  be  the 
wrong  direction.  That  is  to  say,  if  income  is  ex- 
8  As  Pierce  has  discussed  [23],  a  less  extensive  forecasting  effort  is 
made  each  month  just  prior  to  a  FOMC  meeting.  This  effort  in- 
volves  the  updating  of  earlier  forecasts  through  an  extensive  exami- 
nation  of  incoming  data  and  how  they  agree  with,  or  have  tended 
to  modify,  the  projections  presented  in  previous  months.  See  also 
[2]. 
9 In  recent  testimony  by  Chairman  Burns  before  the  Senate  Banking 
Committee  (July  24.  1975),  members  of  the  Senate  Committee  re- 
quested  the  release  of  the  staff  economic  forecast  conditional  on  a 
particular  growth  rate  in  the  money  stock.  Chairman  Burns  did  not 
appear  to  favor  this  suggestion,  and  his  response  emphasized  some 
of  the  same  points  discussed  in  this  and  following  paragraphs. 
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that  it  is  going  to  fall  in  the  future  unless  he  eases 
up,  it  is  very  difficult  to  get  him  to  ease  up  because 
that  sort  of  policy  recommendation  is  contrary  to 
what  is  going  on  currently.  I  must  say  that  until 
our  models  do  a  lot  better,  his  wariness  may  be 
justified.  Again,  the  problem  is  one  of  how  to 
handle  risk:  what  if  the  model  were  wrong?  What 
if  the  economy  were  expanding  very  rapidly,  the 
policymaker  eases  up,  but  economic  expansion  be- 
comes  more  rapid?  The  cost  of  the  error  to  the 
policymaker  would  be  very  large  [23,  p.  18].10 
A  Model  of  the  Long-Run  Strategy  The  longer- 
term  policy  process  described  above  conforms  to  a 
general  class  of constrained  optimum  problems.  That 
is,  policymakers  may  be  viewed  as  maximizing  a 
utility  or  preference  function  subject  to  the  con- 
straints  imposed  by  the  economic  structure  or  by 
other  considerations.  Equation  (1)  states  that  the 
utility  of  the  policymaker  is  a  function  of  the  devi- 
ation  of  the  final  targets  from  their  desired  levels, 
with  greater  utility  being  associated  with  smaller 
deviations.11  Let  U  represent  the  policymaker’s 
utility.  Then  : 
maximize  U=  f1(YA  -  Y*)  (1) 
subject  to  YA =  f2 (ML,  XL)  (2) 
and  (2a) 
where  Y  is  a  vector  of  final  target  variables  such  as 
GNP  and  prices.  The  superscript  A  denotes  the 
actual  value  of  the  variable,  and  the  asterisk  denotes 
a  desired  value.  The  symbol  represents  the 
variance  of  some  interest  rate  R,  is  a  constant,  M 
is  the  money  stock,  X  represents  other  determinants 
of  the  final  targets,  and  the  subscript  L  is  a  distrib- 
uted  lag  operator,  The  side  constraints  represented 
by  equations  (2)  and  (2a)  reflect  the  limitations 
imposed  on  policymakers  by  the  structure  of  the 
economy  and  by  the  volatility  of  interest  rates. 
The  expected  values  of  the  final  targets  will  gen- 
erally  depend  upon  the  structure  of  the  economy,  the 
particular  dial  settings  for  the  intermediate  target 
variable  selected  by  the  central  bank,  dial  settings  for 
fiscal  policy  selected  by  Congress  and  the  President, 
and  the  values  of  other  determinants  such  as  the 
level  of  consumer  and  business  confidence,  price  ex- 
pectations,  the  degree  of  capacity  utilization,  and 
international  developments.  The  forecast  of  final 
10 The  issue  here  is  quite  complex.  The  policymaker  must  act  in 
the  face  of  uncertainty  over  structural  parameters  and  with the 
knowledge  that  there  is  a  lag  between  actions  and  effects. In 
addition,  there  is  the  distinct  possibility  that  incoming  data  may  be 
revised  substantially  and  thereby  alter  the  appropriate  policy  re- 
sponse.  Against  this  background,  it  is  often  difficult  for  policy- 
makers  to  be  convinced  to  move  an  instrument  now  to  affect  a  final 
target  one  year  in  the  future.  Perhaps  some  of  the  recent  applica- 
tions  of  control  theory  to  stabilization  policy  will  prove  helpful  in 
educating  both  policy  advisers  and  policymakers. 
11 To  be  more  precise,  (f1)  is  an  inverse  function;  that  is,  the 
policymaker  is  minimizing  disutility  (or  “losses”)  by  minimizing  the 
deviations  of  the  actual  target  values  from  desired  levels. 
targets  by  the  staff  assumes  specific  dial  settings  for 
the  intermediate  target  variables,  e.g.,  the  money 
stock,  and  also  involves  assumptions  concerning  all 
of  the  above  determinants  of  economic  activity  not 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  Federal  Reserve.12 
This  process  is  summarized  by  equation  (2),  which 
condenses  the  SMP  model  and  the  consensus  fore- 
cast  for  the  final  targets  into  a  simple  expression.13 
It  is  presumed  that  the  policymaker  believes  that 
changes  in  the  money  stock  lead  in  a  systematic 
fashion,  albeit  with  a lag,  to changes  in prices,  output, 
and  employment.14 
Equation  (2a)  is  included  as  a  constraint  to  ac- 
count  for  the  Fed’s  ongoing  desire  to avoid  disorderly 
conditions  in  financial  markets  that,  in  turn,  might 
frustrate  the  achievement  of  the  final  targets.  A 
discussion  of  the  constraint  on  interest  rate  volatility 
is  the  subject  of  Section  VI. 
Before  closing  the  discussion  of  the  long-term 
strategy,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  many 
members  of  the  FOMC  might  object  to  the  causal 
sequence  that  seems  to  underlie  equation  (2)  :  open 
market  operations  money  stock  economic  activity. 
More  specifically,  some  might  prefer: 
YA  =  f2 (RL,  XL) 
where  R  is  a  short-  or  long-term  interest  rate,  and 
the  implied  causal  sequence  is  more  like  the  trans- 
mission  mechanism  of  the  SMP  model  [ 7,  pp.  7-9]. 
In  part  the  issue  involved  here  concerns  the  endo- 
geneity  or  exogeneity  of R  and  M  and  which  variable 
ought  to  be  the  intermediate  policy  target  [27].  For 
purposes  of  this  article,  this  complex  issue  is  side- 
stepped  for  two  reasons.  First  if  one  ignores  the 
error  term  in  the  demand  for  money  function,  it  may 
be  solved  in  terms  of  the  interest  rate  or  the  money 
stock,  and  either  may  be  treated  exogenously  for 
12 This  being  the  case,  the  forecast  may  be  wrong  because  the  fiscal 
policy  assumption  is  wrong,  the  Federal  Reserve  does  not  achieve  the 
dial  setting  for  the  intermediate  target,  the  structural  parameters 
underlying  the  forecast  are  incorrect,  or  there  is  a  stochastic  shift 
in  a  behavioral  relationship.  One  point  relevant  to  this  problem, 
which  has  received  all  too  little  attention  in  the  literature,  is  the 
interdependence  of  stabilization  policy  actions.  For  example,  if  a 
restrictive  monetary  policy  leads  to  a  response  by  the  Congress  or 
the  President  to  ease  fiscal  policy,  the  forecaster  must  anticipate 
this  reaction. 
13 As  noted  above.  each  member  of  the  FOMC  might,  in  effect,  have 
a  different  specification  for  equation  (2)  because  of  an  alternative 
view  of  structural  relationships.  In  this  regard,  equation  (2) 
despite  its  simplicity,  should  not  be  mistaken  for  so-called  reduced 
form  models  purporting  to  link  the  money  stock  or  the  monetary 
base  to  economic  activity. 
14  Throughout  this  article  error  terms  are  generally  ignored.  Clearly, 
the  staff  should  express  the  confidence  intervals  and  standard  errors 
around  a  particular  forecast  for  the  final  targets. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1975 forecasting  purposes.15  That  is,  a  large  macroecono- 
metric  model  may  contain  a  correctly  estimated 
money  demand  function  : 
M  =  a0 +  a1y  +  a2R 
where  a0,  a1,  and  a2  are  estimated  parameters,  M  is 
money  demand,  y  is  nominal  income,  and  R  is  the 
interest  rate.  The  forecast  for  the  final  targets  is 
independent  of  whether  the  money  demand  equation 
is  solved  for  M  or  for  R: 
R= 
M  -  a0 -  a1y 
a2 
Second,  M  is  the  assumed  intermediate  target  vari- 
able  in  equation  (2)  because  the  FOMC  has  chosen 
to  index  its  policy  stance  publicly  in  terms  of  M1  and 
other  monetary  aggregates.16  The  use  of  the  word 
“index”  is  meant  to  imply  that  even  though  members 
of  the  FOMC  may  have  different  views  of  the  policy 
transmission  mechanism  in  general,  and  the  causal 
role  of  changes  in  the  money  stock  in  particular,  the 
FOMC  has  been  able  to  reach  an  agreement  to  ex- 
press  its  policy  in  terms  of  growth  rates  in  the  mone- 
tary  aggregates. 
IV.  The  Linkage  Between  the  Long- 
and  Short-Run  Strategy 
Having  selected  a  long-run  dial  setting  for  money 
stock  growth,  perhaps  5 percent  over  the  next  twelve 
months,  the  FOMC  must  now  guide  its  open  market 
operations  monthly  so  as  to  achieve  the  desired  long- 
run  monetary  growth  path.  It  is  important  to  recog- 
nize  that  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  monthly  and 
quarterly  patterns  of  monetary  growth  for  the  money 
stock  that  could  turn  out  to  average  5  percent  over  a 
full  year.  As  will  be  shown,  the  monthly  pattern 
desired  by  the  FOMC  will  generally  depend  upon 
interest  rate  considerations  and  the  current  position 
of  the  money  stock  vis-a-vis  the  long-run  target. 
The  relationship  between  the  short-  and  long-run 
dial  settings  for  M1  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  It  is 
assumed  that  a  5  percent  long-run  growth  path  for 
M1  was  adopted  in  December,  and  by  the  January 
FOMC  meeting  M1  is  well  below  its  targeted  long- 
run  path.  Under  these  circumstances  the  staff  would 
normally  prepare  three  (or  more)  alternative  short- 
run  money  stock  paths  for  FOMC  consideration, 
each  designed  to  return  M1  to  the  long-term  path 
15  Such  a  procedure  would  not  be  legitimate  for  estimation  purposes 
because  of  the  bias  that  would  be  introduced  by  treating  a  variable 
exogenously  if  in  fact  it  were  endogenous.  See  [16]  for  a  discussion 
of  this  latter  point  and  how  it  is  related  to  models  of  money  stock 
determination. 
16 See  the  “Record  of  Policy  Actions”  appearing  each  month  in  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
but  each  requiring  successively  longer  adjustment 
periods.17  With  reference  to  Figure  1,  a  rapid  return 
to the  long-run  path  may  require  an  8  percent  growth 
rate  for  M1  in  the  January-February  control  period 
(A).  Alternatively,  slower  growth  rates  of  7  and  6 
percent  in  the  January-February  control  period  and 
in  several  successive  periods  would  return  M1  to  the 
long-run  path  in  May  (B)  and  July  (C),  respec- 
tively.  The  process  underlying  the  selection  of  these 
alternative  paths-i.e.,  the  short-run  formulation  of 
policy  and  the  actual  short-run  alternative  selected 
by  the  FOMC-are  discussed  in  the  following  sec- 
tions. 
V.  A  View  of  the  Short-Run  Strategy 
The  short-run  strategy  of  the  FOMC  involves  the 
selection  of  a  short-run  dial  setting  for  the  money 
stock  and  the  development  of  an  operating  procedure 
for  achieving  the  desired  monetary  growth  path.  The 
process  begins  with  the  staff  presenting  to the  FOMC 
each  month  a  set  of  alternative  short-run  (two- 
month)  growth  rates  for  the  money  stock.  Associated 
with  each  alternative  short-run  path  for  the  money 
stock  will  be  a  growth  rate  of  bank  reserves  and  a 
level  of  the  Federal  funds  rate. 
In  formulating  the  short-run  strategy,  income 
movements  are  taken  as  given  ; that  is,  income  for  the 
coming  two-month  control  period  is interpolated  from 
17 Currently  the  control  period  for  the  FOMC’s  short-run  strategy  is 
two  months-in  December  the  control  period  is  December-January, 
in  January  it  is  January-February,  etc. 
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ALTERNATIVE  SHORT-RUN  DIAL  SETTINGS 
Note:  The  growth  in  reserves  and  the  money  stock  are  expressed 
at  seasonally  adjusted  annual  rates,  while  the  funds  rate  is  ex- 
pressed  as a  level. 
the quarterly  projection  of economic  activity  described 
earlier.  The  important  assumptions  underlying  this 
procedure  are  that  the  quarterly  projection  and  the 
monthly  interpolation  are  correct  and  that  there  is 
no  significant  simultaneity  problem  over  a  one-  or 
two-month  period.  To  illustrate,  again  consider  the 
example  used  in  Figure  1.  Assume  it  is  the  end  of 
January,  that  the  consensus  forecast  specifies  5  per- 
cent  monetary  growth  from  December  to  July,  and 
that  the  money  stock  actually  declines  in  January. 
Normally,  in  the  face  of  this  one-month  shortfall  in 
the  money  stock,  the  staff  would  not  revise  its  income 
projection  for  the  coming  months.  This,  in  effect, 
assumes  the  policy  lag  is  greater  than  one  or  two 
months  and  that  subsequent  policy  actions  will  result 
in  growth  in  the  money  stock  that  will  overshoot  the 
target  by  enough  to  offset  the  miss  in  the  first  month. 
Given  income  and  the  current  position  of  the 
money  stock  vis-a-vis  the  long-run  target  path  as 
depicted  in  Figure  1,  the  staff  might  present  at  the 
January  FOMC  meeting  a  set  of  short-run  alterna- 
tives,  as  in  Table  I.18 
The  first  row  contains  alternative  short-run  growth 
rates  that  will  return  the  money  stock  to  its  long-run 
path.  Alternative  (A)  and  the  staff  discussion  ac- 
companying  it  would  indicate  that  to  achieve  an  8 
percent  growth  rate  in  M1  and  to  return  to  the  long- 
run  path  by  February,  the  growth  in  reserves  over 
the  January-February  period  would  have  to  be 8 
percent  and  the  level  of  the  Federal  funds  rate  re- 
quired  is  6 percent.19 
18 The  alternatives,  along  with  a  discussion  of  the  situation  that 
might  develop  in  financial  markets  under  each  option,  appear  in  the 
“Bluebook,”  which  is  prepared  monthly  for  the  FOMC.  See  [2, p. 
285].  The  actual  alternative  selected  by  the  FOMC  is  now  published 
with  a  45-day  lag  as  part  of  the  policy  record.  The  alternatives 
contained  in  the  Record  of  Policy  Actions  for  the  January  1974 
FOMC  meeting  are  the  first  available.  In  the  discussion  that  follows 
we  will,  for  simplicity,  ignore  M2,  even  though  it  appears  with  M1 
under  each  alternative  the  FOMC  considers. 
19 It  is  worth  noting  that  the  FOMC  has  from  time  to  time  selected 
an  alternative  that  has  included,  for  example,  the  money  stock  under 
(A)  and  the  funds  rate  under  (B).  In  this  case,  the  FOMC 
decided  the  staff  had  misspecified  the  relationship  between  the  funds 
rate  and  monetary  growth  and  has  constructed  a  new  alternative 
thought  to  be  internally  consistent.  Thus,  the  FOMC  is  free  to 
evaluate  and  to  accept  or  reject  the  trade-offs  among  interest  rates, 
reserves,  and  money  stock  growth  implied  by  the  staff  estimates. 
See  also  n.  27. 
The  Federal  funds  rates,  shown  in  row  2  of  the 
table,  are  derived  in  two  steps.  First,  assuming  in- 
come  given,  a  money  demand  function  is  solved  for 
the  short-term  interest  rate  necessary  to  achieve  the 
alternative  short-run  money  path.  The  required 
Federal  funds  rate  is  then  determined  using  a  term 
structure  equation  relating  it  to  the  short-term  in- 
terest  rate.  As  was  true  in  the  forecast  of  economic 
activity,  each  alternative  represents  a  staff  consensus 
based  on  econometric  models  and  judgmental  con- 
siderations.20 
The  third  row  of  the  table  could  in  theory  be  de- 
rived  by  solving  a  money  supply  function  for  the 
rate  of  growth  in  reserves  necessary  to  achieve  each 
money  stock  alternative.  That  is,  if  one  viewed  the 
money  supply  as  the  product  of  a  reserve  aggregate, 
such  as  reserves  available  to  support  private  deposits 
RPD,21  and  a  multiplier  m,  then  the  necessary 
growth  in  reserves  could  be  obtained  by  estimating 
the  multiplier,  calculating  the  different  February 
levels  of  the  money  supply  M  consistent  with  each 
money  stock  alternative,  and  dividing  one  by  the 
other  (RPD  =  M/m).22 
In  practice,  as  discussed  by  Axilrod  and  Beck  [1], 
the  approach  is  demand  oriented.  After  projecting  the 
interest  rates  consistent  with  the  short-run  money 
stock  growth  rate  for  each  alternative,  these  rates  are 
used  to  estimate  bank  demand  for  required  and  excess 
reserves  [1,  p.  89].  An  important  characteristic  of 
this  approach  is  that  it  results  in  the  supply  of  re- 
serves  and  money  being  perfectly  elastic  at  the  tar- 
geted  level  of  the  interest  rate  R  and  the  volume  of 
reserves  and  money,  therefore,  being  demand  deter- 
mined.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2,  where  the 
demand  for  reserves  is  expressed  as  a  function  of  the 
interest  rate.23  Assume  the  position  and  slope  of  the 
demand  schedule  for  reserves  TR1  have  been  esti- 
mated  by  the  staff  and  that  TR1  is  the  level  of  total 
reserves  in  February  that  is  derived  from  deposit 
demand  consistent  with  a  6  percent  growth  rate  in 
the  money  stock.  Under  the  demand  approach  dis- 
cussed  above,  the  required  interest  rate  is  R1,  and 
20 Monthly  financial  models  developed  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
and  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  are  major  inputs  in 
this  process.  For  a  discussion  of  these  models,  see  the  papers  by 
Pierce  and  Thomson  [24, 25]  and  Davis  and  Shadrack  [8]. 
21 The  reserve  aggregate  currently  employed  by  the  FOMC  in  its 
deliberations  is  called  “reserves  available  to  support  private  deposits” 
RPD.  This  magnitude  is  defined  as  total  reserves  minus  required 
reserves  against  government  and  interbank  deposits.  It  should  be 
noted  here  that  there  is  little  objective  evidence  that  RPD’s  have 
received  much  weight  in  the  formulation  or  implementation  of  policy. 
Speaking  of  the  1973  period,  Tschinkel  said:  “The  Manager  [re- 
flecting  the  desires  of  the  FOMC]  found  RPD  of  lesser  importance 
in  the  determination  of  his  response  to  the  emerging  patterns  of 
monetary  growth”  [29,  p.  105].  See  also  the  recent  evaluation  of 
Kane  [12,  pp.  841-3]  and  the  discussion  that  follows. 
22 The  particular  reserve  aggregate  one  chooses  (e.g.,  total  reserves. 
nonborrowed  reserves.  the  monetary  base,  RPD.  etc.)  is  not  a  critical 
issue  here. 
23 While  the  following  diagram  relates  the  interest  rate  to  reserves, 
one  could  just  as  easily  substitute  the  money  stock  for  reserves. 
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rate.  Thus  the  supply  function  TRS  is  horizontal. 
This  means  that  stochastic  shifts  in  the  reserve  de- 
mand  (or  money  demand)  function,  an  error  in  the 
income  projection,  or  any  other  disturbance  on  the 
demand  side  will,  in  the  first  instance,  alter  the 
position  of  TRD  to  TR’D  and  lead  to  changes  in  the 
quantity  of  reserves  to  TR2.24 
This  can  be  contrasted  with  a  supply  approach  to 
money  stock  control,  which  would  lead  to  the  interest 
rate  being  demand  determined.  Again  with  reference 
to  Figure  2,  the  level  of  total  reserves  thought  neces- 
sary  to  achieve  the  6  percent  growth  in  the  money 
stock  remains  TR1.  Accordingly,  the  System  would 
supply  the  volume  of  reserves  represented  by  the 
vertical  TRS  function.  Any  disturbance  on  the  de- 
mand  side  will  alter  the  interest  rate  to  R2  and  leave 
the  quantity  of  reserves  (and  money)  unaffected.  In 
the  absence  of any  disturbance  (i.e.,  in a deterministic 
system)  both  approaches  yield  the  same  result  (R1 
and  TR1). 
The  point  that  must  be  emphasized  is  that  one 
should  not  infer  from  the  appearance  of  a  reserve 
aggregate  in  Table  I  that  the  FOMC  has  adopted  a 
supply  approach  to  money  stock  control.25  Evidence 
that  the  growth  in  reserves  has  had  a  low  weight  in 
the  System’s  reaction  function  (i.e.,  in  the  formula- 
tion  and  implementation  of  policy)  is  easily  obtained. 
Simply  compare  the  specifications  voted  for  reserves 
RPD,  the  money  stock,  and  the  funds  rate  in  1974 
with  the  actual  outcomes,  shown  in  Table  II.26  This 
exercise  in  revealed  preference  shows  that  the  Fed- 
eral  Reserve  rarely  missed  the  funds  rate  range  but 
allowed  reserves  and  the  money  stock  to  move  away 
from  the  specified  range  in  about  one-half  of  the 
two-month  control  periods.  Assuming  the  initial 
specifications  were  internally  consistent,  the  conclu- 
sion  must  be  that  in  the  short  run  disturbances  were 
allowed  to  affect  quantity  and  not  price.  While  this 
issue  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  Section  VI, 
the  evidence  in  Table  II  suggests  the  System  was  not 
controlling  reserves  over  the  short  run.27 
24  While  income  is  a  shift  parameter  in  this  two-dimensional  dia- 
gram,  an  increase  in  income  would  actually  result  in  a  movement 
along  the  demand  function  for  demand  deposits,  time  deposits.  and 
reserves  in  three-dimensional  space. 
25  Brunner  and  Meltzer,  Friedman,  and  the  St.  Louis  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  have  long  advocated  such  an  approach. 
26 As  detailed  in  Section  VI,  the  short-run  dial  settings  selected  by 
the  FOMC  are  actually  expressed  as  ranges.  The  rationale  for  the 
ranges  is  explained  on  pp.  11-12. 
27 An  interesting  feature  of  this  approach  to  policymaking  is  that  a 
member  of  the  FOMC  might  vote  for  Alternative  (A)  in  Table  I 
even  though  he  viewed  monetary  policy  as  operating  primarily 
through  interest  rates  and  thus  really  preferred  the  interest  rate 
under  Alternative  (B).  In  other  words,  members  of  the  FOMC 
may  vote  for  individual  elements  in  the  table  rather  than  columns. 
Support  for  this  interpretation  is  provided  by  Maisel:  “A  possible 
side  advantage  of  this  strategy  is  that  it  can  be  followed  even  though 
it  might  be  impossible  to  get  agreement  among  the  members  of  the 
FOMC  either  as  to  ultimate  goals,  or  the  form  or  level  of  an  inter- 
mediate  monetary  variable.  or  as  to  how  to  define  what  strategy  is 
being  followed”  [17,  p.  154]. 
A  Model  of  the  Short-Run  Strategy  The  follow- 
ing  set  of  equations  may  be  used  to  link  the  Federal 
funds  rate  to  open  market  operations  on.  the  one 
hand  and  the  money  stock  on  the  other:28 
MD =  f3 (yL,  RL)  (3) 
R= f4 (RFFL)  (4) 
RFF =  f5 (TRD,  TRS)  (5) 
TR = NBR + MBB = ER +  RR  (6a) 
NBR = FR + RR  (6b) 
where  MD, is  the  demand  for  money,  y  is  nominal 
income,  R  is  a  short-term  interest  rate  such  as  the 
ninety-day  commercial  paper  rate,  RFF  is  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate,  NBR  is  nonborrowed  reserves,  MBB 
is  member  bank  borrowings,  ER  is  excess  reserves, 
FR  is  free  reserves  (ER  -  MBB),  RR  is  required 
reserves,  and  TRD is  the  demand  for  and  TRS  the 
supply  of  total  reserves.  The  first  three  relations  are 
straightforward.  Equation  (3)  is  a  standard  money 
demand  function  ;  equation  (4)  is  a  term  structure 
relation,  where  the  short-term  rate  (e.g.,  the  ninety- 
day  commercial  paper  rate)  is  a  function  of  a  dis- 
tributed  lag  on  the  funds  rate  (single-day  matur- 
ity).29  Equation  (5)  specifies  the  funds  rate  as  a 
28 For  simplicity  we  will  continue  to  ignore  time  deposits  and  there- 
fore  M2. 
29 See  [14]  for  evidence  that  a  major  portion  of  the  variance  in 
short-term  rates  can  be  explained  by  current  and  lagged  movements 
in  the  Federal  funds  rate. 
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serves.  In  (6a)  total  reserves  are  divided  into 
familiar  components-required  reserves  and  excess 
reserves-which,  by  definition,  must  equal  reserves 
borrowed  from  the  System  and  all  other  reserves 
(nonborrowed  reserves).  By  rearranging  terms,  a 
convenient  identity  (6b)  can  be  formed.  This  latter 
identity  may  be  transformed  into  an  equation  with 
behavioral  content  by  considering  the  right-hand  side 
as  reflecting  the  behavior  of  the  public  and  the  banks 
and  the  left-hand  side  as  reflecting  the  behavior  of 
the  Fed.  That  is,  the  banks’  demand  for  required 
reserves  is  derived  from  the  public’s  demand  for 
deposits.  This,  together  with  the  banks’  demand  for 
free  reserves,  must  equal  the  total  of  nonborrowed 
reserves  supplied  by  the  Federal  Reserve  open  mar- 
ket  operations.30  Other  factors,  such  as  the  gold 
stock,  float,  and  Treasury  deposits  at  the  Federal 
Reserve,  also  affect  the  supply  of  nonborrowed  re- 
serves.  However,  holding  these  other  factors  con- 
stant  or  assuming  that  the  System  engages  in  so- 
called  “defensive”  open  market  operations  to  offset 
movements  in  these  factors,  NBR  is  controllable  by 
policymakers.  For  present  purposes,  these  other 
factors  are  held  constant,  and  the  change  in  non- 
borrowed  reserves  is  assumed  equal  to  the  change  in 
the  System’s  holdings  of  securities.  Therefore,  the 
change  in nonborrowed  reserves  directly  reflects  open 
30 See  [5,  Chapter  1]  for  a  discussion  of  the  key  role  of  the  free 
reserves  equation  in  the  financial  sector  of  the  SMP  model. 
market  operations  (i.e.,  NBR  =  OMO).  In 
summary,  the  funds  rate  is  determined  by  the  supply 
of  nonborrowed  reserves  relative  to  the  demand  for 
required  reserves  and  free  reserves.31 
To  close  the  model,  the  System’s  short-run  reac- 
tion  function  relating  OMO  to  RFF  must  be  speci- 
fied.  Ignoring  for  the  moment  the  constraint  on 
interest  rate  volatility,  the  desired  level  of  the  funds 
rate  RFF*  can  be  determined  by  solving  equations 
(1)  to  (4)  recursively  for  a  relationship  between 
long-run  target  values  of  the  money  stock  and  RFF: 
RFF*  =  f6(M*)  (7) 
In  practice  it  is  the  short-run  target  value  for  the 
money  stock,  rather  than  the  long-run  target  value, 
that  would  usually  appear  in  equation  (7).  The 
reason,  as  discussed  in  Sections  IV  and  VI,  is  that 
the  change  in  the  funds  rate  required  to  get  the 
money  stock  back  on  the  long-run  path  (assuming  it 
is  significantly  off  the  path),  is  usually  deemed  too 
large  and  disruptive  by  the  policymaker. 
Once  equations  (1)  to  (4)  have  been  solved  for 
RFF*,  equation  (8)  follows  from  equation  (5)  and 
the  supporting  identities  : 
NBR  =  OMO  =  f7(RFF*  -  RFFA)  (8) 
31  It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  set  of  equations  presented  is 
intended  to  be  very  genera1  and  should  not  be  construed  as  a  com- 
plete  model  of  the  financial  sector  and  its  interaction  with  Federal 
Reserve  policy.  This  is  a  task  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present 
paper.  As  it  stands  the  set  of  equations  is  under-identified.  and  no 
attempt  is  made  to  account  for  various  aspects  of  simultaneity. 
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by  selling  (buying)  securities  when  the  funds  rate 
is  below  (above)  the  desired  level.  This  policy  ap- 
proach  ensures  that  the  supply  of  reserves  is  perfectly 
elastic  at  the  desired  funds  rate  and  the  quantity  of 
reserves  is  demand  determined.  In  the  first  instance, 
deviations  in  the  demand  for  reserves  from  the 
FOMC  specifications  lead  to  an  equivalent  change  in 
the  stock  of  reserves  but  to  no  change  in  the  funds 
rates.32 
There  is  in  theory  a  mechanism  that  limits  the 
pro-cyclical  movement  in  reserves.  The  dynamics  of 
the  inter-meeting  phase  of  the  short-run  policy  pro- 
cess  are  embedded  in  a  feedback  control  loop  that 
can  be  summarized  by: 
RFF*  =  f8 (M*  -  MA)  (9) 
That  is,  movements  in  the  funds  rate  depend  upon 
deviations  of  the  money  stock  from  its  desired  value. 
To  illustrate,  assume  incoming  data  on  the  money 
stock  suggest  that  monetary  growth  over  the  short- 
run  two-month  target  period  will  exceed  the  short- 
run  dial  setting  selected  at  the  last  FOMC  meeting. 
In  response  the  Manager  of  the  Trading  Desk  would 
be  expected  to  increase  the  dial  setting  for  the  funds 
rate.  In  practice,  however,  the  timing  and  magnitude 
of  the  Manager’s  initial  response  to  apparent  devi- 
ations  of  monetary  growth  from  desired  levels  are 
often  not  so  straightforward.  If  the  tone  of  the  se- 
curities  markets  is  weak,  for  example,  the  FOMC 
might  decide  not  to  change  the  funds  rate  for  the 
time  being,  even  though  the  money  stock  is  growing 
above  the  desired  rate.33 
A  more  difficult  problem  contributing  to  cautious 
adjustments  of  the  funds  rate  is  the  uncertainty  con- 
cerning  the  money  stock  forecasts.  This  uncertainty 
results  from  the  fact  that  forecasts  of  the  money 
stock  over  the  short  run  (e.g.,  one  to  three  months 
ahead)  have  not  been  very  accurate  [29].  This  being 
the  case,  the  FOMC  often  may  delay  its  response  to 
an  apparent  deviation  of  actual  from  desired  mone- 
tary  growth  until  more  data  are  available  to  con- 
firm  the  error.  The  rationale  is  that  the  policy- 
maker  prefers  to  avoid  “whipsawing”  the  market- 
i.e.,  raising  the  Federal  funds  rate  now  if  money 
growth  appears  to  be  exceeding  desires  and  lowering 
32  A point worth  mentioning  in  this  context  is  that  a  change  in 
reserve  requirements  has  virtually  no  impact  on  reserves  or  the 
money  stock  unless  accompanied  by  a  change  in  the  funds  rate 
target.  If.  for  example,  the  System  lowers  the  reserve  requirement 
on  demand  deposits,  other  things  equal,  this  will  push  down  the 
funds  rate.  However,  as  depicted  in  equation  (8),  this  will  result 
in  the  System  selling  securities  and,  therefore,  absorbing  the  free 
reserves. 
33  For  a  recent  example  of  such  an  occurrence  see  the  “Record  of 
Policy  Actions”  of  the  FOMC  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin 
(January  1975),  p.  26. 
it  later  if  the  money  stock  projections  prove  incorrect 
and  actual  money  growth  is  found  to  be  close  to  that 
desired.  This,  of  course,  is  another  facet  of  the 
System’s  desire  to  minimize  short-run  interest  rate 
volatility  and  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
VI.  The  Constraint  on  Interest  Rate  Volatility  and 
Its  Interaction  with  Policy  Targets 
Within  the  FOMC’s  current  strategy,  the  target 
values  for  the  Federal  funds  rate,  reserves,  and  the 
money  stock  are  actually  expressed  as  ranges.  Re- 
ferring  back  to  Table  I,  under  alternative  (A)  for 
example,  the  entry  for  the  money  stock  might  be  7 
to  9  percent  and  the  entry  for  the  Federal  funds  rate 
might  be  5½  to  6½  percent.  From  the  viewpoint  of 
the  staff,  the  ranges  presented  to  the  FOMC  gener- 
ally  represent  a  standard  error  around  a  point  esti- 
mate  at  the  midpoint  of  the  range.  From  the  view- 
point  of the  FOMC,  however,  the  ranges  may  have  a 
somewhat  different  meaning.  The  range  for  the 
money  stock  is  typically  viewed  as  a  range  of  toler- 
ance.  If  the  money  stock  is  expanding  at  a  rate 
within  its  range,  then  the  desired  level  of  the  Federal 
funds  rate  will  probably  not  be  altered  to  any  signifi- 
cant  degree.34  Thus,  in  terms  of  equation  (9),  M* 
is  a  range  and  RFF*  equals  zero  unless  MA  is 
outside  the  range. 
The  following  quotations  suggest  there  are  at  least 
two  interpretations  attached  to  the  reasoning  behind 
any  given  range  for  the  money  stock  adopted  by  the 
FOMC:  (1)  “The  inherent  short-run  volatility  of 
the  monetary  aggregates  is  one  reason  why  the  Com- 
mittee  expresses  its  short-run  guides  in  terms  of 
ranges  of  tolerance”  [21,  p.  334].  In  this  view  the 
range  implies  a  standard  error  around  a  point  esti- 
mate.  (2)  “The  Committee  chose  tolerance  ranges 
for  M1  .  .  .  that  were  at  least  as  restrictive  as  the 
alternatives  presented  by  the  staff  and  reduced  the 
lower  ends  of  these  ranges  to  indicate  its  willingness 
to  accept  substantially  slower  growth  in  the  near 
term”  [29,  p.  108].  In  this  view  the  Committee 
skews  its  preferences,  perhaps  in  response  to  previous 
deviations  of actual  from  desired  levels.  Suppose  the 
staff  presents  an  alternative  such  as  (C),  which 
implies  that  an  8  percent  Federal  funds  rate  will 
translate  into  a  5-7  percent  growth  in  the  money 
stock,  the  point  estimate  being  6  percent  growth. 
The  FOMC,  responding  to  past  shortfalls  in  money 
stock  growth,  might  then  modify  this  alternative  by 
34  This  discussion  assumes  that  incoming  data  and  forecasts  of  non- 
financial  developments  are  consistent  with  the  projections  set  out 
when  the  long-run  trajectory  for  the  money  stock  was  first  selected- 
as  a  result.  the  FOMC  has  not  modified  the  long-run  money  stock 
target. 
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willingness  to  err  on  the  side  of  more,  rather  than 
less,  monetary  growth  relative  to  projected  levels. 
Operationally,  this  means  that  if  the  money  stock 
actually  should  grow  at  an  8  percent  rate,  this  will 
not  result  in  a  raising  of  the  desired  Federal  funds 
rate. 
The  significance  of  the  Federal  funds  range  is  that 
it  specifically  limits  the  degree  of  response  by  the 
Manager  to  a  deviation  of  monetary  growth  from 
the  desired  range.  As  shown  in  Table  II,  this  range 
in  1974  was  typically  100-150  basis  points.  If  the 
midpoint  of  the  range  selected  is  equal  to  the  Federal 
funds  rate  prevailing  just  prior  to  the  FOMC  meet- 
ing,  then  the  FOMC  has  typically  been  willing  to 
tolerate  a maximum  change  in  the  funds  rate  of  SO-75 
basis  points  in  one  direction  over  any  given  inter- 
meeting  period.35  Against  this  background,  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  the  money  demand  functions 
that  underlie  the  specifications  presented  to  the 
FOMC  exhibit  very  low  interest  elasticities  [4;  8; 
24;  25].  The  monthly  model  discussed  by  Pierce 
and  Thomson  [25,  p.  351],  for  example,  indicates 
that,  other  things  equal,  a  100  basis  point  change  in 
the  Federal  funds  rate  will  lead  to  only  about  a  0.3 
percentage  point  change  in  the  annual  growth  rate  of 
the  money  stock  over  a  one-month  period  and  only 
about  a  one  percentage  point  change  over  a  six-month 
period.  Assuming  the  interest  elasticities  embedded 
in  the  monthly  models  are  reasonably  accurate,  the 
constraint  on  the  monthly  movement  in  the  Federal 
funds  rate,  as  explicitly  revealed  by  the  range  in  the 
Policy  Record  for  the  funds  rate,  suggests  that  the 
FOMC  is  willing  to  tolerate  relatively  large  short-run 
deviations  of  monetary  growth  from  desired  levels.36 
Whether  or  not  the  constraint  on  month-to-month 
movements  in  interest  rates  has  significant  desta- 
bilizing  effects  on  output  and  prices  depends  on  the 
narrowness  of  the  short-run  constraint  and  whether 
or  not  it  frustrates  achievement  of  the  long-run 
money  stock  target.37 
With  regard  to  the  narrowness  of  interest  rate 
tolerance  bands,  Pierce  conducted  some  experiments 
35 From  time  to  time  the  FOMC  has  been  willing  to  change  the  upper 
or  lower  end  of  the  range  on  the  funds  rate  and  thus  permit  a 
larger  inter-meeting  movement  in  the  funds  rate.  For  a  recent 
example,  see  the  “‘Record  of  Policy  Actions”  of  the  FOMC  in  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  (February  1975),  p.  88.  In  addition,  if 
the  funds  rate  prevailing  at  the  time  of  the  meeting  is  at  the  upper 
or  lower  end  of  the  adopted  range,  it  is  possible  that  the  full  100-150 
basis  point  range  could  be  used  during  the  inter-meeting  period. 
36 In  other  words,  short-run  monetary  control  is  considered  too 
“costly”  because  of  the  volatility  of  interest  rates  that  seems  to  be 
required.  For  a  critical  review  of  this  issue  see  [15].  For  some 
evidence  that  short-run  deviations  of  monetary  growth  from  the 
desired  trajectory  might  not  be  “costly”  in  terms  of  missing  price 
and  output  targets,  see  [6,  p.  24]. 
37 It  also  depends,  of  course,  on  the  willingness  of  the  FOMC  to 
modify  the  constraint  over  time.  In  this  regard,  the  FOMC  has 
clearly  been  willing  to  tolerate  larger  swings  in  interest  rates  over 
the  first  half  of  the  1970’s  than  it  did  over  most  of  the  1960’s. 
with  the  SMP  model  and  concluded:  “The  results 
indicate  that  the  placement  of  sufficiently  narrow 
bounds  on  the  change  in  the  bill  rate  can  have  a  large 
impact  on  the  simulated  value  of  GNP”  [22,  p.  101]. 
It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  if  the  band  on  interest 
rate  movements  is  fairly  narrow  and  inflexible,  it 
is  reasonable  to  question  whether  or  not  the  money 
stock  is  being  “controlled”  at  all. 
In  theory,  at  least,  the  current  FOMC  approach 
to  the  formulation  of  policy  is  designed  to  guard 
against  short-run  deviations  of  money  stock  growth 
affecting  the  achievement  of  the  long-run  money 
stock  target.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  3.  Assume 
the  FOMC  selected  a  4-6  percent  long-run  growth 
path  for  the  money  stock  in  month  1  of  year  1, 
growth  in  the  money  stock  in  months  5 and  6  of  year 
1  has  been  8  percent,  and  the  FOMC  is  meeting  at 
the  beginning  of  month  7.  Further,  assume  the  pre- 
vailing  Federal  funds  rate  is  5 percent.  As  discussed 
in  Section  IV,  the  short-run  alternatives  for  the 
money  stock  presented  to  the  FOMC  by  the  staff  will 
typically  be  tied  to  a  specific  time  path  for  returning 
the  growth  of  the  money  stock  to  the  desired  range. 
For  example,  alternative  (A)  would  envision  only  2 
percent  growth  in  the  money  stock  over  the  next 
two  months  and  thus  an  early  return  to  the  range. 
This  might  require  a  sharp  rise  in  the  Federal  funds 
rate  to  perhaps  7 percent.  Alternative  (B),  however, 
would  envision  a  slower  return  to  the  upper  end  of 
the  desired  range  ; the  money  stock  might  be  expected 
to grow  at  a  5 percent  rate  for  five  months  and  return 
to  the  range  by  month  11.  This  alternative  would 
require  a  smaller  current  rise  in  the  Federal  funds 
rate  to  perhaps  6  percent,  possibly  followed  by  fur- 
ther  rises  in  subsequent  months.38  An  examination 
of  month-to-month  movements  in  the  funds  rate: and 
in  monetary  growth  over  the  past  several  years  sug- 
gests  that  the  FOMC  has  in  practice  more  often 
preferred  to  pursue  an  alternative  such  as  (B).39 
One  significant  area  of  concern  with  regard  to  this 
policy  approach  is  the  possible  existence,  from  time 
to  time,  of  a  serially  correlated  error  in  the  income 
projection.  Suppose  the  staff  is  underestimating  the 
strength  in  aggregate  demand  and  the  money  stock  is 
expanding  more  rapidly  than  desired.  Since  the 
38 It should  be  noted  that  one  alternative  may  envision  an  immediate 
return  to  the  desired  range  without  any  significant  change  in  the 
funds  rate.  The  explanation  accompanying  such  an  alternative  may 
be  that  the  monthly  pattern  of  income  growth  suggests  smaller 
increases  in  coming  months  and  thus  less  strength  in  money  demand. 
Another  possible  explanation  is  that  the  current  spurt  in  monetary 
growth  is  a  random  occurrence  not  likely  to  persist. 
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with  the  income  projection  and  the  associated  esti- 
mate  of  the  demand  for  money,  the  initial  tendency 
may  be  for  the  policymaker  to  discount  the  jump  in 
monetary  growth  and  wait  for  further  data  that 
would  confirm  greater  strength  in  economic  activity 
and  money  demand.  The  incorrect  presumption  is 
that  the  spurt  in  monetary  growth  is  the  result  of  a 
stochastic  shift  in  money  demand.  The  long-run 
implications  of  accommodating  this  growth  are  a 
more  pro-cyclical  policy  than  desired  and,  given  the 
lags  in  the  effect  of  policy,  the  need  later  on  for  a 
very  sharp  tightening  in policy  to offset  past  excesses. 
An  important  problem  for  monetary  control  that 
can  result  from  a  series  of  short-run  deviations  of 
monetary  growth  is  that  the  FOMC  might  give  up 
on  the  long-run  money  stock  target  de  facto  by  con- 
tinually  resetting  the  starting  (or  base)  date  of  the 
control  period  over  which  the  target  value  is  to  be 
attained.  This  might  happen,  for  example,  if  the 
policymakers  find  it  impossible  to  tolerate  the  large 
increases  in  interest  rates  necessary  to  offset  past 
excesses  in  monetary  growth.  This  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  4,  which  is  similar  to  Figure  3  except  that 
the  FOMC  is  presumed  to  adopt  alternative  (C)  at 
its  meeting  early  in  month  7.  The  long-run  target 
remains  4-6  percent  but  is  calculated  from  month  6 
rather  than  from  month  1.40  Unfortunately,  this 
subtle  ratcheting-up  (or  down)  of  the  long-run 
monetary  growth  rate  could  exacerbate  the  cyclical 
swings  in  output  and  prices.41 
VII.  Some  Final  Remarks 
This  article  has  presented  a  view  of  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  current  approach  to  the  formulation  and 
implementation  of  monetary  policy.  It  is  hoped  the 
general  interpretation  presented  will  be  critically  ex- 
amined,  the  discussion  of  particular  phases  of  the 
strategy  carefully  scrutinized,  and  the  models  that 
40  The  FOMC  recently  made  such  a  shift  in  the  base  of  its  current 
long-run  money  stock  target.  On  May  1,  1976,  Chairman  Burns 
announced  before  the  Senate  Banking  Committee  that  the  FOMC 
planned  money  stock  growth  of  5  to  7½  percent  over  the  period 
March  1975-March  1976.  On  July  24,  1975,  the  Chairman  announced 
before  the  House  Banking  Committee  that  the  targeted  growth  rate 
was  the  same.  but  the  period  over  which  it  was  to  be  obtained  was 
the  second  quarter  of  1975  to  the  second  quarter  of  1976.  Since  the 
money  stock  grew  at  nearly  a  9  percent  rate  in  the  second  quarter 
of  1975,  this  change  in  the  base,  in  effect,  accepts  much  of  the 
intervening  monetary  expansion. 
41  See  Poole’s  recent  paper  [26,  pp.  25-30]  for  some  further  possible 
pitfalls  within  the  current  strategy. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  13 underlie  the  strategy  empirically  tested.  This  should 
result  in  a clearer  understanding  of current  monetary 
policy  procedures,  more  carefully  developed  advice 
for  policymakers  on  how  to  improve  their  perfor- 
mance,  and  greater  success  in  achieving  the  goals  of 
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